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Abstract. The main task of supply chain management is to balance efficiency and 
effectiveness. Numerous operational management strategies are used to make a supply 
chain efficient, one such is inventory management. In this paper, we will consider a 
particular part of a supply chain consisting comprising a manufacturer and a retailer with 
the goal of minimizing associated inventory costs. We will focus on an inventory of final 
products determined as the difference between supply and demand and are expressed as a 
function of price, inflation rate and change in inflation rate resulting in the possible 
speculations. The manufacturer’s inventory cost is a function of these same variables, with 
the retailer’s inventory cost having the same function in addition to the margin. The 
problem is formulated as a dynamic game to share the speculation problem. The optimiza-
tion problems to be solved are optimal control theory problems with objective functions 
in the form of integral functional with the integrand depending on the state function and 
its first and second derivative. 
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In the last two decades, supply chain management has been a topic addressed in 
numerous studies and researches. Prior to the actual economic crises, one way to 
increase profit was to increase revenue. Nowadays, companies are looking for other 
ways of achieving profitability. Strategies such as minimizing cost, optimizing 
processes and establishing cooperation in a supply chain have been increasingly 
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incorporated into business plans. In addition to these strategies, companies often 
speculate to increase the profit, and to avoid poor business results. 
E–commerce is a good example of price speculation, especially in regard to compu-
ter components and accessories, as well as fashion goods and toys. In these cases, 
we encounter speculation for reselling purposes. The second type of speculation is 
found in supply chains, including numerous entities and in opportunities to mani-
pulate prices, costs, demand, information, inventory and deadlines. The distribu-
tors often retain stocks to create product scarcity and in turn stimulate demand 
and increase prices. The third type of speculation occurs in macroeconomic 
movements, without or with intervention from monetary authorities. Supply chain 
members may find themselves in a situation where loans are subject to uncertain 
interest rates and will incorporate this uncertainty in their prices. They may also 
expect discrete intervention from monetary authorities which in turn may impact 
prices. Moreover, we observe situations as prices decrease due to fall in consu-
mption, something that creates a good environment for speculation. 
The type of speculation addressed in this paper refers to supply chain management 
where demand and supply depend on product prices and prices trends. The main 
motive lies in the fact that supply chain members do not cooperate and mistrust 
each other. Even if theory suggests this behavior, cooperation is not common in 
practice. Moreover, speculation in supply chains may occur in the situations men-
tioned earlier. 
Our contributions shall cover several points. We will look at a supply chain consi-
sting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer delivers products to the 
retailer. Some of the production remains in the manufacturer’s inventory. The 
retailer purchases the products and upon receiving them immediately sells some 
of the products, with the remainder becoming part of the retailer’s inventory. 
Hence, the manufacturer and retailer have their own inventories comprising the 
same product. Both want to minimize inventory costs and the shortage risks, i.e., 
maintain a high level of service and satisfying demand. Supply and demand 
depend on price and the price trends which in turn result in speculation on 
quantities, where inventory is defined as the difference between supply and 
demand. The problem is defined as the Stackelberg game, where the retailer is 
the leader and the manufacturer is the follower. The optimization problems to be 
solved are optimal control theory problems with objective functions in the form 
of integral functional and the integrands depending on the state function, as well 
as its first and second derivative.  
In this paper, we will derive the necessary condition for the follower’s optimal 
solution (i.e. the manufacturer), and derive the optimal price time path as well as 
discuss the conditions for this time path to have economic sense. The leader’s 
optimal solution (i.e. the retailer) will be future work. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief review of the litera-
ture on speculations in supply chains. Section 3 develops the model in the form 
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of a Stackelberg game. In Section 4 we derive and interpret the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for manufacturer’s optimal price time path. In Section 5 we 
prove the positivity of the manufacturer’s price time path, while Section 6 presents 
conclusions and future work. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
This section provides an overview of important literature in the area of 
speculations in supply chain management, especially when viewed as optimal 
control theory problems‡ with the objective function in the form of a functional 
integral and the integrands depending on the state function, its first and second 
derivative. When considering this specific problem, we find that literature 
covering this issue is a bit scarce. 
The literature we mostly relied on is paper [2] which considers the case of dual 
sales channels. Speculations in this case are possible because the price difference 
in two stages of a supply chain leads to the possibility of reselling. The authors 
examine the influence of speculations on a manufacturer’s and a retailer’s ordering 
decisions. In some cases, both the manufacturer and retailer benefit from 
speculations, whereas in some cases both are hurt by a high number of specula-
tions. The problem is defined as a two-player game, the manufacturer and retailer 
maximizing their profits subject to stochastic primary demand.  
Logistics problems involving service parts were considering in paper [5]. This kind 
of problem induces a strong interaction between network design and inventory 
sharing due to the high cost, low demand for parts and deadlines. The problem is 
defined as a non-linear integer programming problem which in fact presents a 
modified binary knapsack problem. The problem of inventory sharing is defined 
in general as two facilities in a supply chain where they endeavor to minimize 
facility, inventory and transportation costs in line with deadlines. 
Inventory control subject to speculation was addressed in paper [3] where the 
authors studied the problem of determining inventory levels based on stochastic 
demand with the objective of minimizing the total cost as the sum of purchasing, 
holding and penalty costs for a single supply chain member. That is, they conside-
red forward buying for a retailer opposing an expected increase in the supplier’s 
price.  
Paper [4] does not propose any mathematical model representing an optimization 
problem, but the authors did analyze the role of speculation in the respective price 
boom. Large amounts of speculative money were invested in different commodity 
derivatives resulting in significant and unwarranted upward pressure on 
commodity prices. 
In [6] a model to allocate stock levels at warehouses, each facing Poisson demand 
is considered. The authors proposed a non-linear integer programming model and 
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developed an enumerative method to solve it. The results show that the proposed 
inventory sharing strategy results in considerable cost reduction when compared 
to the no-sharing case and the method is quite efficient for the considered test 
problems. 
As our summary above illustrates, and based on our knowledge, not many papers 
consider the inventory sharing problem in terms of optimal control theory. 
Moreover, from a mathematical point of view, only a few papers treat the optimal 
control theory problem using an objective function in the form of integral 
functional where the integrand depends on the state function, its first and second 
derivative.    
 
3. Modeling the problem 
 
As mentioned above, we have a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a 
retailer. The manufacturer produces products. Part of the products are delivered 
to the retailer while the remainder is located in the manufacturer’s inventory. The 
retailer buys a certain number of the products. Some of it is sold immediately 




Figure 1: A supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer 
 
The inventory is determined as the difference between supply and demand 
depending on the price and its trend represented by the price’s first and second 
derivative. In general, supply and demand are given by 
 
''' wpuppQs    
''' npmppQd   , 
 
where 0,,,   and  Rwunm ,,,  are the speculative elements. The 
elements              are speculative in the that consumers decide whether to decre-
ase demand as inflation increases or increase demand to create additional the 
inventory. The elements            are speculative in that the product supplier can 
increase supply and create inventory for reselling as inflation increases or the 
Rnm ,
Rwu ,
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supplier can decrease supply as inflation increases. In line with this concept, the 
manufacturer’s inventory at any given moment is 
 
'')(')()( pnwpmupQQ drsm   , 
 
where p is the manufacturer’s price, smQ  the manufacturer’s supply and drQ  the 
retailer’s demand. The retailer’s inventory at any given moment is 
 
 
'')1)((')1)(()1)(( pinwpimupiQQ dcsr   , 
 
where i>0 is the retailer’s margin, srQ  the retailer’s supply and dcQ  the 
customers’ demand. 
We assume that the manufacturer and retailer divide only the speculative part of 
the inventory to optimally prevent price changes. Thus, let              be the manu- 
facturer’s share, and let                 be the retailer’s share in the speculative 
inventory. 
The  manufacturer’s  objective is  to minimize  its  inventory  cost over the period                                        







)('')()(')()()()(min  , 
where )(tpcm  is the inventory cost as a percentage of its value. 









)('')1)()(1()(')1)()(1()()1)(()1(min   
where )()1( tpicr   is the inventory cost as a percentage of its value and 0i  is 
some minimum margin for the retailer. 
Since the manufacturer and retailer know that a certain amount of inventory has 
to exist in order to avoid certain risks in the supply chain, we determine a 
Stackelberg game§ between manufacturer as the follower and the retailer as the 
leader as follows: 
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2 )('')()()(')()()()()()(min   
 
4. Solution to the manufacturer’s problem 
 
To solve this optimization problem in the form of a Stackelberg game, we apply 
the concept of backwards induction. First, we solve the manufacturer’s and then 
the retailer’s problem.  
We introduce the following notation:  A ,  B , )( mukC  , 








2 '''min . 






















')0(')0()(')('' .   
If we introduce the notation  
   )0(')0()(')()0()(
2





  ,  
the manufacturer’s objective function is 
)( nwkD 
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2 ''''  
where )(Tp  and )(' Tp  are known as macroeconomic forecasts, and the corres-
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 22 ')',( DpBpApppLL  ,  
and assuming that 0
D
B






  where 
D
B
a  .  
 
4.1. Interpretation of the existence conditions for 
manufacturer’s price time path 
 











Thus, if 0D  then 0
D
B
. The assumption that 0D , where )( nwkD    
means that 0 nw , i.e. the difference between the speculative elements in the 
manufacturer’s supply function and the retailer’s demand function is negative. 
Thus, a price change trend sensitivity for the manufacturer is less than the price 
change trend sensitivity for retailer, which is very reasonable since the retailer is 
more sensitive on price changes due to his flexibility. This condition is used to 
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obtain the manufacturer’s optimal price time path. If the condition is not satisfied 
for an optimal price time path, the manufacturer and retailer have to negotiate.  
 
5. Positivity of the manufacturer’s price time path 
 







We will now prove its positivity. With   , b>0, a>0  and  ∈ 0,   we  










′ 0 . 
Further 
                                     ′                                  (1) 
 
                                    ′′  .                              (2) 
 
Also 0  for  , i.e.  
 
                                               .                                          (3)  
 
The time path  has a stationary point ∗ if constants   and 	 have 
the same sign. Thus 
                                               2 ∗ ln  .                                                   (4) 
 
The stationary point is negative if   1 and positive if  1.  
The time path  has an inflection point 	 ̃  if constants   and 	 have 
different signs. Thus  2 ̃ ln . The inflection point is negative if   1 and 
positive if 1.  
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5.1. Case t=0,  . 
 
From 0 0 it follows that  
                                                                                             (5) 
 
1a) If , 0 we have 0 and  is a convex function as a positive 
combination of two convex functions. It has a global minimum in its stationary 
point. On the other hand, due to (5) and the assumption that the constants are 
positive, we have 1 	> 0. It follows that 	ln 0. The stationary point is 
negative. Hence, the time path  is an increasing function and  
 
max  
min 0 . 
 
1b) If  , 0 then   is a concave function and reaches a maximum at its 
stationary point. Due to (5) and the assumption that the constants are negative, 
we have 	> 1. It follows that 		ln 0, or the stationary point in which the 
maximum is obtained is positive. Thus, the stationary point is ∗ ln . Also, 
∗ 0 0. 
 
1b1)  If  ∗ , the time path   is an increasing function on [0,T] and  
 
max  
                                         min 0  . 
It follows that  0. 
1b2)  If  0 ∗  we have  
 
0 	 ∗  for 0 ∗ 
 
∗  for ∗ . 
 
1c) If the constants  	and	   have different signs, on account of (5) we have 
0, 0  and   is an increasing function on [0,T],   
 
max  
                                         min 0 .  
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It follows that  0. 
 
 
5.2. Case t=0,  0. 
 
From 0 0 it follows that 
                                           .                                                         (6) 
 
2a) If , 0, it follows that 0 and   is a convex function as a 
positive combination of two functions. It obtains the global minimum at the 
stationary point. On the other hand, due to (6) and the assumption that the 




and 	ln 0. The stationary point is positive. If the global minimum is in the 
interval [0,T] then the function decreases till t* and subsequently increases. If 
∗  the function decreases from p(0) till p(T). 
 
2b)  If  , 0, then  is a concave function and has a global maximum at 
its stationary point it. On the other hand, due to (6) and the assumption that the 
constants are negative, we have 1 	> 0 and thus 	ln 0. The stationary 





2c)  If constants  ,   have different signs due to (6), we have 0, 0  






5.3. Case t=0,  . 
 
Now   
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0.5 0  
 
3a) If  0  i.e. 0 ,  we have  0  and ′ 0 
for t > 0. Thus  is an increasing and convex function on [0,T] and increases 
from p(0) to p(T). 
 
3b) If  0,  i.e. 0 ,  we have 0 for t > 0. 
Thus  is a decreasing and concave function on [0,T]. It decreases from p(0) 




Thus 0.  
 
3c) If   0  i.e.  0  we have 0 for ∈ 0, . 
 
Remark. For the considered interval [0,T] we assume that p(T)>0 due to the 
assumption of a macroeconomic forecast.  
 
6. Conclusions and future work 
 
In this paper, we have considered a particular supply chain consisting of a 
manufacturer and a retailer, both having the goal of minimizing their inventory 
costs. Inventory is determined as the difference between supply and demand, 
which are functions of price, inflation rate and inflation rate changes and resulting 
in possible speculation. To mitigate the risk, these two players can share the 
speculative part of the inventory. The problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game 
where the manufacturer is the follower and the retailer is the leader. 
We derived the price time path by minimizing the manufacturer’s inventory cost 
under certain conditions. These conditions require that the retailer is more 
sensitive to price trends than the manufacturer, which we find to be reasonable. 
Finally, we proved that the price time path is positive, assuming that a given and 
positive forecasted price at the end of the considered period. 
In future research, the optimal margin time path for the retailer and the optimal 
share of inventory for both players should be derived. In addition, the problem 
can also incorporate reversed roles, where the manufacturer is the leader and the 
retailer is the follower. 
The problem of inventory sharing can also be viewed also as a multicriteria optimi-
zation problem and the results compared to the results from the problem modeled 
as a Stackelberg game. 
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